Thursday, July 20, 2006

Case Summaries

July 17, 2006, Slip Opinions. One criminal case.

U.S. v. Michael Siwek, No. 05-3545. ( D. Nebraska). Before Circuit Judges Colloton, John R. Gibson, and Gruender. Opinion by Circuit Judge Gruender. PUBLISHED.

"Siwek entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and criminal forfeiture." He appeals a District Court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle.

The Eighth Circuit reviewed the legal conclusions of the District Court de novo and reviewed for clear error the District Court’s; 1) factual findings under Stevens, and 2)determination of voluntariness of a consent to search under Mancias.

Siwek argues a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred because:

1) He did not voluntarily consent to a search of his truck
2) Assuming consent, the search exceeded the scope of his consent.
3) He withdrew his consent.
4) Evidence in the truck bed would not have been reasonably discovered.
5) Government did not have reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Siwek, and
6) Government did not have probable cause to search the truck bed.

The Eight Circuit held that 1) Siwek consented to the search of his truck, White, 2) search was within the scope of consent, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), 3) consent was not withdrawn, U.S. v. Sanders, U.S. v. Gray, 4) it is unnecessary to address other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Wells. Additionally the Eighth Circuit held that the District Court’s decision to deny Siwek’s motion to suppress evidence was proper.

Melissa N. Tessaro, Branch Office Administrative Assistant
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Eastern & Western Districts of Arkansas

July 14, 2006, Slip Opinions. One criminal case.

U.S. v. Richard Ashton Oslund, No. 04-3956. (D. Minnesota). Before Circuit Judges Riley, Hansen, and Colloton. Opinion by Circuit Judge Hansen. PUBLISHED.

Following a two week jury trial, Oslund was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, murder with a firearm during a robbery affecting interstate commerce, and felon in possession of a firearm. Oslund appeals his conviction and sentence of two consecutive life terms in prison, a concurrent twenty year term of imprisonment, and $278,745.00 restitution.

Oslund first argues improper admission of evidence because 1) the tape recordings did not meet all of the McMillan requirements, 2) third party government agent testified regarding the tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Oslund and cooperating witness and therefore, the government failed to lay proper foundation for introduction of incriminating tape recording, 3) cooperating witness needed to testify to explain "gaps" in the recordings, and 4) incriminating statements made during the tape recorded conversations were induced.

The Eighth Circuit held:

1) "The McMillan factors are a guide for the court to use, and if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the recordings satisfies the court as to their reliability, even if not every factor is explicitly and completely met, admission is proper."
2) The government agent "identified each speaker in the recordings and thus authenticated the identity of the participants." U.S. v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938, 949 (8th Cir. 1987), "Any person may identify a speaker’s voice if he has heard the voice at any time."
3) According to Byrne, only the weight of tape recorded evidence is affected by gaps in the recording, not the admissibility.
4) There was not any evidence that Oslund’s participation in the tape recorded conversations was not voluntary as required by Brown. Additionally, assuming that the cooperating witness’s motives were entirely self-serving, the totality of the circumstances make it clear that the cooperating witness gave his consent.

Next, Oslund argues that the five year delay 1) was prejudicial to his case, and 2) caused a key piece of evidence to be destroyed.

The Eighth Circuit held that Oslund failed to raise this issue at the District Court level, prior to trial as required by U.S. v. Farmer, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3), and is not entitled to seek any type of relief on this issue.

Next, Oslund argued that the government committed improper vouching during it’s redirect of Oslund’s cellmate.

The Eighth Circuit held that vouching, statements regarding or implying the truthfulness of a witness, did not occur on the part of the government but rather by a "witness regarding his opinion of statements made by Oslund." The Eighth Circuit reviewed for plain error because Oslund failed to object to the redirect testimony at trial. During cross-examination of the witness, Oslund solicited the cellmate’s personal opinion based upon his participation in the conversation, opening the door for the government to seek the participant’s opinion.
Next, Oslund argues that the government made improper remarks during closing which 1) attacked the integrity of the defense counsel, and 2) were insulting.

The Eight Circuit held that in the instant case, Oslund failed to object to statements made during closing argument which waives such an objection. The Eighth Circuit reviews for plain error stating, "while we find the statements troubling, we conclude that the statements in question were not so "plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious" that reversal is required in order to avoid a "plain miscarriage of justice." Billingsly, 277 F.3d at 997 (internal marks omitted.)""
Oslund argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the two identifying eyewitnesses who testified at trial, are unreliable.

The Eighth Circuit reviewed this matter de novo, concluding not to "second-guess the jury’s determination" for the following reasons; 1) only the jury can evaluate the eyewitness testimony, 2) the District Court properly instructed the jury on factors to consider when weighing eyewitness testimony, 3) the defense had ample opportunity to raise and argue the issue of eyewitness reliability to the jury, and 4) then it was up to the jury to determine the weight of eyewitness identification. The Eighth Circuit held that even without the eyewitness identification, the remaining evidence against Oslund would ensure that a "jury could reasonably find Oslund guilty." and this argument is without merit.

Additionally, Oslund argues that his sentence under the mandatory Guidelines is unconstitutional and he should have the opportunity to be resentenced by the District Court.
The Eight Circuit held that the District Court made a clear record at sentencing that it "would have imposed the same sentence in Counts 1 and 3 had the Guidelines been treated as advisory." The District Court stated in part, "[s]hould you ever be released, and it would be contrary to my recommendation that they do so, it is ordered by statute that you serve a term of supervised release." and "what you did ought not to be repeated, and I’m placing you in a position where you may not do so." The record is clear that had the Guidelines been advisory, the District Court would have imposed the same sentence on each count.

Finally, Oslund objects to the restitution ordered on two grounds: 1) it is a question for the jury under Blakely/Booker, and 2) the inclusion of future earnings is not allowed by statute.
The Eight Circuit held that argument one fails because "neither Blakely nor Booker affects the determination of restitution or the burden in establishing a proper amount. See U.S. v. May, 413 F.3d 841,849 (8th Cir.)" The Eighth Circuit held that under the MVRA, restitution is mandatory and that "the District Court has wide discretion in ordering restitution. U.S. v. Reichow, 415 F.3d 802, 804-02 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 784 (2005). Future income may be awarded under MVRA. In the instant case, Oslund does not challenge the amount of future earnings income awarded by the District Court, only its award in general. The employer had already paid almost half of this future earnings amount to the family and had committed to pay the remaining amount. It is unlikely that the employer would have agreed to pay an unjustified amount. It is not improper for lost income to be included in the restitution order.

Melissa N. Tessaro, Branch Office Administrative Assistant
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Eastern & Western Districts of Arkansas

July 13, 2006, Slip Opinions. Two criminal cases.

U.S. v. Jose Ortiz-Martinez, No. 05-3105/3107 (N.D. Iowa). Before Circuit Judges Colloton, Beam, and Hansen. Unpublished. PER CURIAM.

Ortiz pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture and possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture and appeals the District Court sentence of concurrent 168 months and 120 months prison terms and concurrent 10 year and 8 year terms of supervised release. The District Court also revoked a term of supervised release stemming from a prior federal conviction and sentenced Ortiz to 12 months in prison to run consecutive to the sentence for the new offenses.
Counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, arguing that it is unclear if the supervised release sentence is to run concurrent or consecutive to the sentence for the new charges. The Eighth Circuit held that the record is clear that the sentences are to run consecutive.

Ortiz argues 1) improper application of the remedial portion of Booker, 2) he was entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was being held on an indictment, and 3) guilty plea was invalid.
The Eighth Circuit rejected all of Ortiz’s arguments based upon, 1) U.S. v. Salter, 418 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1399 (2006)., 2) Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(2); U.S. v. Rose, 541 F.2d 750, 753 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977)., and 3) U.S. v. Murphy, 899 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1990).

U.S. v. Terron Brown, No. 05-3896 (D. Nebraska). Before Circuit Judges Arnold, Fagg, and Colloton. Opinion by Colloton. PUBLISHED.

Brown was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. The GOVERNMENT appeals Brown’s 240 month prison sentence. In a previous appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Brown’s convicted, but remanded the case for resentencing in light of U.S. v. Booker, 414 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2005).

"On remand, the District Court held a sentencing hearing, and renewed its findings from the first sentencing hearing that Brown’s total offense level was 40, derived from a base offense level of 38 for at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base", "and a two-level adjustment for possession of a firearm. At that hearing, the court also sustained Brown’s objection to an adjustment for role in the offense, saying it did so "in view of the Apprendi and Blakely decisions." At the second hearing, the government failed to renew "its contention that a role adjustment should be applied." The District Court reduced Brown’s criminal history category from IV to II, because the court decided that it was "overstated".

Considering all of these factors, Brown’s advisory guideline range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The District Court departed downward from the advisory range and sentenced Brown to 240 months imprisonment. The District Court reasoned that although the jury found a conspiracy to distribute 1.5 kilograms based upon the cooperating witnesses testimony of the quantity that each had trafficked, this finding assumes that the witnesses memories as to quantity were accurate and that they dealt this quantity of cocaine only with Brown. For this reason, the court isn’t required to be bound by the drug quantity found by the jury in determining a sentence.

In it’s appeal, the government argues that the District Court’s 10 years downward departure from the minimum "advisory Guidelines range is unreasonable in light of statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)."

The Eighth Circuit reviewed the reasonableness of the extent of a downward variance under the abuse of discretion standard. Claiborne requires that a District Court, when sentencing outside the Guidelines range, "must give an "appropriate justification" with respect to the factors set forth in §3553(a) to establish the reasonableness of the sentence." In the instant case, the District court cited witness credibility questions as justification to depart downward. Moore assures the District Court has the ability to consider the credibility of witness’s testimony, in its entirety or partially, when determining the advisory Guidelines and considering relevant factors.

The Eighth Circuit held that the District Court’s departure from the advisory Guidelines range, based upon witness credibility, was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, because it appears to be internally inconsistent.
1) The jury determination of drug quantity was used to determine Brown’s base offense level of 38. The jury determination was based upon witness testimony.
2) Varying from this range because the witness’s are not credible would contradict the court’s own credibility finding made in determining the advisory range.
VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.

Melissa N. Tessaro, Branch Office Administrative Assistant
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Eastern & Western Districts of Arkansas

July 12, 2006, Slip Opinions. Four criminal cases.

U.S. v. W.B., No. 06-1552. (D South Dakota). Before Circuit Judges Bye, Lay, and Riley. Opinion by Circuit Judge Bye. PUBLISHED.

"W.B. appeals his conviction by bench trial of being a juvenile delinquent as a result of his aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, arguing testimony by a forensic interviewer concerning the victim’s out-of-court statements should not have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 807."

Victim was the government’s first witness and testified regarding the sexual abuse and that she had never before or since "been so touched." The government’s second witness was the forensic interviewer. After the government established a foundation for her testimony, the forensic interviewer testified as to the victim’s statements to her during a 2005 interview and provided the District Court with a videotape of the interview. After reviewing the videotaped interview, the District Court found that the videotape established a foundation for the expert witness testimony.

The Eighth Circuit held that the victim’s testimony alone was enough to convict W.B. and that the forensic interviewer’s testimony was proper, but unnecessary. Due to the victim’s fear and reluctance to testify more clearly, it was proper for the District Court to allow the forensic interviewer to testify.

U.S. v. Michael Nelson, No. 05-3865. (D. South Dakota). Before Circuit Judges Smith, Heaney, and Gruender. Opinion by Circuit Judge Heaney. PUBLISHED.

"Nelson appeals the District Court’s imposition of a twenty-four month sentence of imprisonment following Nelson’s violation of terms of his supervised release.", stemming from a conviction for conspiracy to manufacture marijuana. At sentencing for the conspiracy offense, Nelson received a 36 month downward departure for "substantial assistance to the government, to be followed by four years of supervised release."

U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to revoke Nelson’s supervised release because he had tested positive for controlled substances on four separate occasions. Nelson was offered treatment, but declined. A search of Nelson’s home "uncovered approximately thirty urine test kits."

The Eighth Circuit held that the imposition of the sentence was within the District Court’s discretion. At sentencing, the District Court made it clear that this sentence was necessary to deter Nelson from further criminal activity. AFFIRMED.

U.S. v. Virgil Bryant, No. 05-1792. (D. Minnesota). Before Circuit Judges Colloton, Beam and Hansen. Per Curiam. UNPUBLISHED.

Bryant appeals "the District Court’s order committing him to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S. C. §4245, which provides for the involuntary hospitalization of an imprisoned person suffering from a mental disease or defect, until treatment is no longer needed or the expiration of the inmate’s sentence, whichever comes first."

At the District Court hearing, the government submitted a report prepared by mental health professionals involved with Bryant’s care at FMC Rochester, MN. These mental health professionals diagnosed psychotic disorder, substance abuse (in remission), and antisocial personality traits which will likely intensify without treatment. These mental health professionals believe that Bryant’s symptoms will improve with treatment, unfortunately they do not believe that Bryant will accept said treatment.

The Eighth Circuit held that based upon the report of the mental health professionals, the District Court’s finding that Bryant be involuntarily committed for mental health treatment was not clearly erroneous. AFFIRMED.

U.S. v. Kevin Michael Dieatrick, No. 05-1279. (S.D. Iowa). Before Circuit Judges Riley, Magill, and Gruender. Per Curiam. UNPUBLISHED.

Dieatrick pleaded guilty in District Court to the use of a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, which, in the instant case, has a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison. "Before sentencing, however, the government filed a substantial-assistance downward-departure motion under 18 U.S. C. §3553(e) and U.S.S.G. §5K1.1 and recommended a sentence of 96 months in prison." Despite the government’s request for a 96 month prison sentence, Dieatrick was sentenced by the District Court to 72 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release.

Dieatrick’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief arguing that the court "unreasonably denied a departure beyond 70 months because 1) the victim and her mother requested leniency, 2) Dieatrick’s cooperation with the government led to the prosecution of other involved in the offense, 3) Dieatrick served 26 months of "hard time" pending sentencing, and 4) Dieatrick was not a distributor of pornography."

Dieatrick filed a pro se brief arguing that 1) the District Court did not verify that he had read the presentence investigation report and should not have sentenced him without said verification. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A), and 2) during an in-chambers sentencing conference, the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by presenting an inflated view of Dieatrick’s codefendant's sentencing possibilities, upon which the court relied in determining a "fair and just" sentence for Dieatrick.

As to counsel’s argument, the Eighth Circuit reviewed Dieatrick’s sentence for reasonableness and found that the District Court considered all factors of Dieatrick’s offense, his extensive cooperation with the government and his criminal history. The Eighth Circuit held that there is no evidence that the District Court based Dieatrick’s sentence upon any improper or irrelevant factor.

As to Dieatrick’s pro se arguments, the Eighth Circuit held that 1) the record reflects that counsel verified reading the entire PSR to Dieatrick, who neither disputed that fact nor requested a continuance. This argument is without merit. 2) There is not indication of prosecutorial misconduct. 3) "Assuming arguendo the prosecutor’s statements in the judge’s chambers were improper, there is no indication the court considered these statements at sentencing so as to deprive Dieatrick of a fair proceeding."

The Eighth Circuit found no other non-frivolous issues. Counsel’s motion to withdraw granted.

Melissa N. Tessaro, Branch Office Administrative Assistant
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Eastern & Western Districts of Arkansas

July 11, 2006, Slip Opinions. Four criminal cases.

U.S. v. Mark T. Davis, No. 05-3738. (W. D. Missouri). Before Circuit Judges Arnold, Smith, and Magnuson. Opinion by Arnold. PUBLISHED.

Davis pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, but at sentencing moved to withdraw his plea. The District Court held that Davis’s motion lacked a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea, and denied his motion.

Davis appeals 1) the District Court’s ruling on his Motion to Withdraw his plea., and 2) "a condition of supervised release forbidding him from having any unsupervised contact with minors", which, if affirmed, would prevent Davis from having any unsupervised contact with his own daughter.

Davis was represented by retained counsel at his plea hearing, during which Davis indicated on the record that he was satisfied with counsel’s services. Following the plea hearing Davis’s retained counsel disappeared. A hearing was scheduled to address the issue of Davis’s missing attorney, and retained counsel, surprisingly, failed to appear at the "Where’s Waldo?" hearing. The District Court appointed the Federal Public Defender’s office to represent Davis.

At sentencing, Davis moved to withdraw his guilty plea which would allow him to challenge
1) the admissibility of the prosecutions evidence, and
2) the admissibility of the witness statements to be used by the prosecution at trial.
The District Court denied Davis’s motion to withdraw.
On appeal, Davis argues "for the first time" that the District Court erred in denying his Motion to Withdraw Plea because 1) the disappearance of his retained counsel, and 2) retained counsel’s "failure to seek suppression of the statements and evidence" against Davis, "amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel".

The Eighth Circuit noted that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are "generally not a basis for direct appeal", and instead reviewed the denial of Davis’s motion for abuse of discretion, and held that abuse of discretion did not occur. Conviction Affirmed.

As to Davis’s untimely challenge to the condition of supervised release, the Eighth Circuit reviewed it for plain error, citing the lack of evidence that "Davis has ever sexually abused a child or that he would try to abuse his own daughter once released from prison."
The Eighth Circuit held that courts should not impose special conditions of supervised release as a matter of course, as occurred in Davis’s case, and therefore the District Court erred. Remanded to amend the special condition of supervised release to allow Davis to have unsupervised contact with his own children.

Circuit Judge Smith dissented on this point citing U.S. v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2005), because 1) all children [including those of the defendant] "are members of the public that the terms of the supervised release seek to protect", 2) Davis is not barred from seeing his daughter, 3) the provision can be modified in the future, 4) According to Mickelson, it is not necessary to prove that Davis personally inflicted child sexual abuse to support restrictions on access to children, and 5) among other types of child pornography, Davis possessed short movies depicting a variety of sexual acts, including acts of sexual bondage with children and images depicting victims under the age of 12.
Affirmed in part, Remanded in Part.

U.S. v. Patricio Sandoval-Rodriguez, No. 05-3589. (S.D. Iowa). Before Circuit Judges Wollman, Hansen, and Benton. Opinion by Circuit Judge Hansen.

Sandoval was found guilty by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine and marijuana and of being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm. Sandoval pleaded guilty to a third charge of illegal reentry into the U.S. Sandoval appeals the conviction and 200 months sentence, challenging
1) the District Court’s denial of "his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because the warrant application contained material misstatements by the affiant" Franks
2) the District Court’s refusal to exclude the testimony of a government witness who was not disclosed until 1 business day before the start of the trial.
3) the District Court’s imposition of a two level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with the drug conspiracy conviction, arguing that it is a Sixth Amendment violation.
4) the 200 month sentence as unreasonable

The Eighth Circuit held;

1) that after removing the material misstatements from the warrant application, the remaining facts more than support a finding of probable cause as required by Franks. The District Court properly denied this motion.
2) that Brady only requires that government witnesses be disclosed prior to the end of a trial. In the instant case, the material was offered by the government, a full three days before trial, therefore there was not a Brady violation.
3) The Supreme Court remedied Sixth Amendment violations by making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, therefore the District Court did not violate Sandoval’s Sixth Amendment rights.
4) that the sentence imposed by the District Court was within the advisory Guidelines range and is reasonable. FFIRMED.

U.S. v. Yureko Suntaun Johnson, No. 05-1353. (S.D. Iowa). Before Circuit Judges Arnold, Bye, and Smith. Unpublished. PER CURIAM.

Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture containing cocaine base; distributing a detectable amount of crack; distribution 5 grams or more of crack; possessing a detectable amount of crack with intent to distribute it; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The District Court held a bench trial to determine drug quantity and found "beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson possessed with intent to distribute well in excess of 50 grams of crack". Johnson received the statutory minimum sentence of 240 months in prison with concurrent supervised release terms with the highest set at 10 years.
On appeal, Johnson’s counsel filed and Anders brief and Motion to Withdraw, arguing that the District Courts’s determination of drug quantity relied upon a government witness who lacks credibility. Johnson filed a motion to appoint new counsel.

The Eighth Circuit held that under U.S. v. Gary, 341 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2003), "the District Court’s determination of witness credibility is virtually unreviewable on appeal". Johnson was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence according to the Guidelines range and according to Lincoln, "sentence within Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable and defendant must rebut that presumption". The were no non frivolous issues. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

U.S. v. Matthew Meyer, aka Mathew Salem, No. 06-1283. (W.D. Arkansas). Before Circuit Judges Smith, Heaney, and Gruender. Opinion by Circuit Judge Heaney , with whom Circuit Judges Smith and Gruender, join, with the exception of footnote 3.

Meyer pleaded guilty to one count of using a minor to produce a sexually explicit videotape and appeals his 270 month prison sentence which is to be followed by a lifetime of supervised release.

Meyer makes the following arguments:

1) District Court committed error by failing to provide adequate notice that it would be imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines range. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h).
2) District Court abused it discretion in its 50% upward departure when sentencing Meyer, by relying significantly on impermissible factors, failed to account for admissible factors, or otherwise committing a clear error of judgment. Haack.

The Eighth Circuit held:

1) Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) does not apply to sentences which are imposed outside of the Guidelines Range. U.S. v. Long Soldier, 431 F. 3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005).
2) U.S. v. Enriquez, 205 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 2000) considers a fifty percent departure to be extraordinary and must be accompanied by extraordinary circumstances. Meyer’s offense occurred in 2003 and the District Court applied the 2003 Guidelines in calculating his offense level, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months, modified by the statutory minimum of 180 months.

Had the 2004 version of the Guidelines applied, Meyer, with an offense level of 43, would have faced a mandatory 360 months sentence. While the 2004 Guidelines cannot be applied retroactively, the 2004 Guidelines help determine the reasonableness of an upward departure. Larrabee, 436 F.3d at 893-94.

The District Court was within its discretion to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range.
Footnote 3 written by Circuit Judge Heaney addresses disparity in the Eighth Circuit’s disposition of cases appealing downward and upward departures from the Guidelines. 92>3% of upward departures are affirmed, while only 15.8 % of downward departures are affirmed. "It is difficult to accept that §3553(a)(6) is satisfied where a circuit treats sentencing appeals in a consistently disparate manner."

Melissa N. Tessaro, Branch Office Administrative Assistant
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Eastern & Western Districts of Arkansas


Anonymous Anonymous said...

I think that drug offenders should be punished to the full effect of the law. They shouldn't be allowed to get away based on legal loopholes,and as such the prosecution should always be on their toes.
Diana King
Addiction Recovery Arizona

Tuesday, July 01, 2008 3:00:00 AM  
Blogger Atun said...

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered three cases in which applicant states asserted that the United States violated the Convention by failing to inform their nationals of their rights under Article 36 (1)(b).


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Tuesday, August 19, 2008 3:34:00 AM  
Blogger Nykemartyn said...

The following are summaries of actual cases that have been managed by our staff. All cases require daily or weekly conversations with the veterans we work with, and 3 way conversations with VA Representatives, attorneys, and other service providers to ensure the veteran's needs are met by a satisfactory resolution. While many cases take just days to conclude, others take weeks, and some can take several months. The following is a small sample of our caseload over the past few years, intended to illustrate the broad geographic scope, spectrum of needs that we serve, and how we serve them.

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Saturday, August 23, 2008 6:42:00 AM  
Blogger maddy said...

Yes, the drug offenders should be punished to the full extent of the law. Don't know why people are spoiling their lives by addicting to drugs. They should be punished severely. Government should take such severe action against drugs.



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Friday, August 29, 2008 12:04:00 AM  

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